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As an undergraduate at Johns Hopkins in the mid-nineties, I visited one of my
advisors during office hours. As I accepted the proffered chair and my marked-up
paper, she gave me a gentle but unambiguous message: “Everett, if you really want
to go to graduate school in English, you’ve got to stop writing about religion.
There’s nowhere to do that anymore.” In context, her advice was well-intended;
Northrup Frye’s examinations of biblical typology were ancient history. A decade
later, however, with theorists as prominent as Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish, and
Slavoj Zizek openly confronting the “return of the religious,” such counsel is more
difficult to imagine. As Mary Louise Pratt asked in her 2003 Presidential Address to
the Modern Language Association, “Who can doubt today the need to study
secularism and religiosity from every viewpoint we can muster?” (427). This issue
of The Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies pursues such viewpoints, recognizing
that the religious and the secular are urgent categories for cultural study that show
all the signs of an emergent discourse.
The articles in this journal issue question the religious and the sacred and seek
to “muster” every viewpoint possible. The first three are primarily theoretical inter-
ventions, while the latter two mobilize theory through careful attention to specific
cultural phenomena. In the first article, Christopher J. Roberts reexamines Marx’s
thinking on religion and emerges with what may be to many a startling discovery:
when Marx refers to religion as “the opium of the masses,” his tone is closer to
empathy than to exposé. Reading Marx through Durkheim and Weber, he demon-
strates that religion must be considered not only as part of society’s superstruc-
ture, but also as part of the base—that in fact we must recognize “religion serving
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not only as a solace, but also as a catalyst.” Ultimately, echoing Zizek’s thoughts
on how ideology is at its most powerful when it offers us freedom from ideology,
Roberts concludes that “we are never more beset by a fixed, inflexible, and uncon-
scious narrative than when we insist that we are finished with or beyond religion.”
The next two articles are broader theorizations of the religious and the secular.
Roland Boer is particularly interested in the shift he observes in his students from
identifying themselves as “religious” to calling themselves “spiritual.” Working
with Bloch, Benjamin, Adorno, and others to connect religion with utopia and “the
discernment of myth,” he explains how secularization “never quite seemed to suc-
ceed” because its “rejection of Christianity relies on Christianity.” Then, Carol
Wayne White critiques the assumptions of both “theological” or confessional
approaches and Enlightenment-driven, purportedly objective approaches to reli-
gious studies. In seeking an alternative that builds especially on the recent work of
Russell McCutcheon, she acknowledges “the inevitable processes of open-ended
textuality,” but also stresses that “just as we should not participate in naïvely
essentialist notions of selfhood, we must be careful not to construct an insufficient
subjectivity, where historical agents are ‘erased’ by linguistic forces over which
they can have little or no control.”
The last two articles both suggest how attention to the religious and the secular
can elucidate close readings of popular culture. Ruth Barcan and Jay Johnston
provide a compelling argument for cultural study of alternative therapies, suggest-
ing that this has not occurred because of the subject’s link to questions of religion
and spirituality; in fact, “religious and spiritual traditions furnish alternative heal-
ing practices with the core ontological characteristics that define the forms of
subjectivity that are foundational to their specific healing practices.” Employing a
modified Foucauldian approach, they give particular attention to acupuncture and
herbalism, linking the former to Taoism and the latter to the Western Esoteric Tradi-
tion. Likewise, Jean Lauer reads the recent Mexican films Santitos and The Crime of
Padre Amaro as case studies of the way contemporary relationships between
women and their priest-confessors continue to reflect the Catholic Inquisition’s
influence on colonial Mexico. Building on archival work on the nation’s history, she
asks how the two films’ main characters upset mother and prostitute stereotypes.
Even more compellingly, she considers why the films present the women in such a
setting, “within the purview of the Church, but in defiance of ‘the rules’ established
by the Church and by society.”
I would also urge readers of the journal to take time to browse the issue’s book
reviews. Written by both established scholars of religion and culture and graduate
students, they further investigate some of the texts surveyed in this introduction,
as well as others not mentioned here. Lori Branch and I are grateful to all of those
who submitted their work to this project, and hope that the outcome will prove
stimulating for many others.
The significance of this project is that historically, whether consciously or un-
consciously, the viewpoints sought for literary study have tended to treat the
religious and the secular as absolutely separate categories. While it may seem
convenient to bracket “church” from “state” or “the supernatural” from “the natu-
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ral,” however, a binary approach unnecessarily restricts our inquiry in this arena as
surely as it does in terms of race and gender. Instead, in the remainder of this essay,
I review a wide range of significant texts for the development of this field, and I ask:
What is generated by neglecting the religious, the secular, or both? Conversely,
what would it look like to take both seriously?
In working through these questions, I consider approaches to religion from think-
ers as diverse as Freud, Talal Asad, René Girard, Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Graham Ward,
and Derrida. Gradually, I develop several key claims: (1) in modern and postmodern
secularization, the religious is not absorbed by the secular, but reorganized through it,
so that the secular may actually serve as evidence of the religious; (2) secularism is a
modern (and postmodern) fundamentalist ideology that emerges from within religion,
not outside it; (3) a central characteristic of the modern and postmodern religious is the
paradoxical attempt to control the transcendent by immersing the self in virtual
communion with the spectacular, whether the setting is the internet, the cinema, a
theme park, or a megachurch; and (4) our religious-secular binary can only be fleshed
out when we recognize how it erases both the distinction between and the interpen-
etration of faith and knowledge.
Danièle Hervieu-Léger’s Religion as a Chain of Memory is a helpful place to
turn for an initial definition of “religion.” She suggests why the term is so notori-
ously difficult to delineate:
Functional [or inclusive] definitions can only testify to the dis-
persion—intellectually beyond control—of religious symbols in
contemporary societies; while substantive [or exclusive] defini-
tions can do no more than reiterate analysis of the loss of religion
in the modern world. Both constitute a partial, yet radically lim-
ited, response to the question of the location of religion in mo-
dernity. Religion is nowhere, or else it is everywhere, which in the
end comes to the same thing. (38)
These extremes can be avoided, however, by assuming that “there is no religion
without the authority of a tradition being invoked (whether explicitly, half-explicitly
or implicitly) in support of the act of believing” (76). With memory’s centrality in
mind, then, Hervieu-Léger offers a basic definition: “a religion is an ideological,
practical and symbolic system through which consciousness, both individual and
collective, of belonging to a particular chain of belief is constituted, maintained,
developed and controlled” (82). This definition seems judicious, as long as one
remembers that the “ideological, practical and symbolic system” may be “implicit,”
as Hervieu-Léger says, or even invisible and unconsciously assumed.
As my professor’s decade-old guidance suggests, however, such a broad con-
ception of religion has been uncommon in the academy. Like Marx’s famous (and,
as Christopher Roberts’s article herein demonstrates, usually de-contextualized)
reference to European, state-sponsored Christianity as the “opium of the masses,”
Freud’s The Future of an Illusion typifies the attitude toward religion that domi-
nated critical theory and practice in the twentieth century. Understandably, Freud
asserts that “religious ideas have arisen from the same need as have all the other
achievements of civilization: from the necessity of defending oneself against the
crushingly superior force of nature [and] the urge to rectify the shortcomings of
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civilization which made themselves painfully felt” (26-27). While this assessment is
sometimes accurate, Freud evinces a curious tension between an apparent desire to
see all religion eliminated and his awareness that such an elimination cannot be
forced. He assumes that:
all [religious doctrines] are illusions and insusceptible of proof.
No one can be compelled to think them true, to believe in them.
Some of them are so improbable, so incompatible with everything
we have laboriously discovered about the reality of the world,
that we may compare them—if we pay proper regard to the psy-
chological difference—to delusions. Of the reality value of most
of them we cannot judge; just as they cannot be proved, so they
cannot be refuted. (40)
Surprisingly, as we will see, Freud sounds for a moment like Derrida some sev-
enty years earlier: he acknowledges that belief is inherently different from knowl-
edge, because it does not rely on the language of proof. Nonetheless, he insists
that all religion is illusion, and decries it as the source of society’s intellectual
poverty. “Think of the depressing contrast between the radiant intelligence of a
healthy child and the feeble intellectual powers of the average adult,” he enjoins.
“Can we be quite certain that it is not precisely religious education which bears a
large share of the blame for this relative atrophy?” (60). Freud’s central hope is that
“a turning-away from religion is bound to occur with the fatal inevitability of a
process of growth, and that we find ourselves at this very juncture in the middle of
that phase of development” (55).
Freud’s work suggests how the secular was perceived in the academy in the
early twentieth-century. In this understanding, religion involves the institutional-
ization of claims about the divine or supernatural, while the secular sphere encom-
passes everything else—the natural and the ordinary. This assumption became
commonplace for work in the tradition of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, but today
sociologists are questioning it in some measure. For instance, Pippa Norris and
Ronald Inglehart’s Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, defends
some versions of secularization, but offers the following caveat: “this does not
imply that all forms of religion necessarily disappear as societies develop; residual
and symbolic elements often remain, such as formal adherence to religious identi-
ties, even when their substantive meaning has faded away” (18). If it is unclear why
the “symbolic” is not “substantive,” the project’s main conclusions deserve an
even closer reading. Having attempted a global measurement of church attendance
and “belief in God,” Norris and Inglehart reveal “two apparently contradictory
trends: (1.) The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been
moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless,
(2.) The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than
ever before—and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population”
(235). We are to understand that the text empirically demonstrates a “return of the
religious” led by the subaltern (who may have never “left” it), which is intriguing in
itself; however, what is more ironic is that Norris and Inglehart demonstrate this
only through the assumption that a neat line can be drawn between sacred and
secular phenomena. One must seriously question whether people appearing weekly
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in churches and telling surveyors that they believe in God makes a culture more
“religious” than any other.
My reservations about a project in the social sciences by no means suggests
that I view the humanities as immune from confusion about these terms. While
there is much to admire about Leigh Eric Schmidt’s Hearing Things: Religion,
Illusion, and the American Enlightenment, for example, it implies that the secular
eliminates the religious. We need to think twice when Schmidt overstates “the
absorption of the sacred and the magical into diverting, didactic spectacles” (137)
or “the sacred’s strange disappearance under the cloak of entertainment” (161), or
when he observes that “all the atmosphere of supernatural solemnity which envel-
oped the sorcerer and the cabalist of ancient times has dissolved away” (163). In
conceptualizing modernity’s and postmodernity’s effects on the religious, meta-
phors like “absorption,” “disappearance,” and “dissolution” are far too absolute;
Bronislaw Szersynski’s term “reorganization” is more accurate. Hervieu-Léger urges
that “instead of thinking of a dwindling religious domain (the institutions of tradi-
tional religion) set against the domains of politics, aesthetics, therapy and so on,
one should look for covert signs of religion in every sphere of human activity” (29).
While this can be taken too far, the point is that the secular does not eliminate the
religious, but sifts and redistributes it.
Few theorists demonstrate the consequences of this distinction as powerfully
as Talal Asad. In Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, he
argues that “the categories of ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ turn out to implicate each
other more profoundly than we thought […]. The concept of the secular cannot do
without the idea of religion” (200). Furthermore, he offers
a counter to the triumphalist history of the secular. I take the
view, as others have done, that the “religious” and the “secular”
are not essentially fixed categories. However, I do not claim that
if one stripped appearances one would see that some apparently
secular institutions were really religious. I assume, on the con-
trary, that there is nothing essentially religious, nor any univer-
sal essence that defines “sacred language” or “sacred experi-
ence.” But I also assume that there were breaks between Chris-
tian and secular life in which words and practices were rearranged,
and new discursive grammars replaced previous ones. (25, em-
phasis in original)
Asad, then, resists not only the common concept of secularization as religion’s
elimination, but also the fundamentalist denial that there exists an actual phenom-
enon that can be labeled “secularization.” He uses the metaphor of “rearrange-
ment,” but with neither the overstatement of “replacement” found in Norris and
Inglehart and Schmidt nor the understatement of “disguise” employed by extrem-
ists who would see religion everywhere in everything. With Asad, we arrive at the
following conclusion: when the religious is acknowledged but not the secular, we
have religious fundamentalism, and when the secular is acknowledged but not the
religious, we have secularism—an absolutist ideology no less dangerous.
This is an apt place to meditate further on what we mean by “secularism.” Asad’s
work investigates “a doctrine called secularism,” which we must not mistake for
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dedication to plurality or diversity. “Secularism doesn’t simply insist that religious
practice and belief be confined to a space where they cannot threaten political
stability or the liberties of ‘free-thinking’ citizens. Secularism builds on a particular
conception of the world (‘natural’ and ‘social’) and of the problems generated by
that world” (191-92). That conception of the world is “not simply an intellectual
answer to a question about enduring social peace and toleration. It is an enactment
by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and tran-
scends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through
class, gender, and religion” (5, emphasis in original). As an ideology, then, secular-
ism denies the presence and significance of the religious, claiming to do so from an
objective space outside of religion’s influence. As we will see, the great irony here
is that secularism is itself a product of religion.
While a number of theorists and historians recognize secularism’s repression of
the religious, René Girard’s Deceit, Desire, and the Novel may be one of the most
unexpected sources. Girard’s central claims about mimetic desire are well known: in
my own terms, rather than imagining that desire is only the interest of subject X in
object Y, we need to understand that it is X’s adoration of mediator Z that leads her
or him to co-opt Z’s desire for Y. This desire can be either “external” or “internal”:
when there is sufficient distance between X and Z, so that Z exists on a plane that
is essentially unattainable or inaccessible for X, this desire is external and less
dangerous. As distance between X and Z decreases, however, the desire becomes
internal and becomes a rivalry. As Girard explains, this is why hatred is so close to
love: the adoration of X for Z causes his or her desire for Y, but since Z also keeps
X from Y, X is led to hate Z.
These are among the central claims of the oft-assigned early chapters of Girard’s
volume. However, the remainder of Girard’s landmark text has received less atten-
tion, perhaps partly because we hesitate to raise issues of religion and secularism.
Girard’s later works are sometimes dismissed for addressing religion too exten-
sively, but the seeds of the later claims are all here: for Girard, God is the ultimate
mediator of Western culture, especially as expressed in Christ, and this is more true
in a period characterized by secularism than ever before. In the early chapters,
Girard shows that “the process of mediation creates a very vivid impression of
autonomy and spontaneity precisely when we are no longer autonomous and spon-
taneous” (38); later, he applies this specifically to secularism. “Denial of God does
not eliminate transcendency but diverts it from the au-delá [the beyond, the above,
the afterlife] to the en-decá [the limited, the below, this life]. The imitation of Christ
becomes the imitation of one’s neighbor” (59). In other words, secularism is about
replacing Christ as mediator of mimetic desire with more immediate cultural heroes,
and then erasing all trace of the substitution. This has at least two effects: “Men
[and women] boast of having discarded their old superstitions but they are gradu-
ally sinking into an underworld ruled by illusions which become increasingly obvi-
ous” (62), and “men [and women] of triangular desire no longer believe but are
unable to get along without transcendency” (66). Girard does not deny that some-
thing crucial has changed with secularization, but he insists that humanity’s present
condition cannot be divorced from its past. Our present longings are in large mea-
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sure the product of religious beliefs that we cannot escape by adopting secularist
repressions of that history.
Bronislaw Szersynski’s Nature, Technology and the Sacred offers a similarly
ambitious critique of secularism’s blinders. Szersynski’s 2005 book maps six mani-
festations of “the sacred,” a term that he uses in order to suggest the mutual
interpenetration of the religious and the secular. Szersynski’s primal sacred, found
today mostly among indigenous cultures, is an expression of polytheism in which
gods inhabit the natural world, but remain numinous; the archaic sacred concen-
trates their power in specific objects, places, or persons that are closely tied to
political power. The monotheistic sacred relocates the divine outside and above the
now-empirical world, while the Protestant sacred further specifies (with the Refor-
mation) that there can be no intermediaries between God and creation, thus making
God both more sublime and more accessible privately than publicly. Out of these
assumptions grows the modern sacred, in which life itself becomes the ultimate
value, accessible via reason or emotion, and most recently the postmodern sacred,
in which the very multiplicity of “sacreds” makes individual subjectivity into the
new God. In each of these categories, Szerszynski’s foundational claim is that the
secular cannot exist independently of the sacred; “the religious meanings that
frame the understanding of nature do not disappear over time—they just alter” (xi).
In fact, “the illusion that the sacred has disappeared is arguably a feature of all
historical transitions from one form of the sacred to the next in a given society” (26).
While Szersynski’s structure is very helpful, it is worth questioning his preference
for “the sacred” rather than “the religious.” In English, the terms were once virtually
synonymous: “religion” was first used to describe the holy calling of a monk or an
order; the earliest medieval uses of “the sacred” also connote special purpose or
dedication. In the wake of the Enlightenment, however, religion connotes participation
in some system of belief, while the sacred becomes a looser antithesis to the secular.
As a result, we no longer notice that our use of the term “the sacred” is itself a
symptom of secularization, an effect of assuming the existence of an autonomous,
empirical, objective reality which religion plays no part in shaping. In this sense,
Szersynski’s vocabulary conveys overtones of the ideology his text otherwise cri-
tiques so powerfully. Even with this reservation, however, Szersynski’s main emphasis
holds: what we have today is not “a secular wasteland, devoid of sacral meaning, but
rather […] a huge diversity of forms of enchantment” (171). Furthermore, the theorists
whose concepts of secularization Szersynski approves (Max Weber, Robert Bellah,
Jürgen Habermas, Marcel Gauchet) share a common claim: “rather than seeing secular-
ization as something that impinges on the history of religion from outside, as the
modernization of society undercuts the ‘plausibility structures’ of religion, this litera-
ture sees secularization as far more intimately related to that history—even to the point
of seeing it as a phase within that history” (15).
I am especially interested in Szerszynski’s claims about the modern and
postmodern sacred. It seems to me that there is a paradox by which the modern and
postmodern religious (my preferred terms) pursue control of the transcendent by
immersing the self in virtual communion with the spectacular. Understanding this,
however, depends on looking back to the monotheistic and Protestant religious as
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they develop in Europe and the Americas, and even to the primal and archaic
religious. First, let us consider Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, published a century ago now. Weber compellingly indicates how mod-
ern capitalism, rather than being the simple antithesis of Christian conceptions of
value, was actually birthed by Protestant devotion to “intense worldly activity,”
which in reaction against Catholicism was regarded as the only way to “disperse
religious doubts and give the certainty of grace” (112). As Weber shows, if “waste
of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins” (157), then the calcu-
lating ethic of the industrial production line follows quite naturally. The move
Weber traces is that from a broad monotheistic religious to one in which techno-
logical efficiency becomes the Holy Grail, or as Szersynski puts it, “the vertical
transcendent axis is increasingly drawn into the empirical world. Instead of Being
and order being seen as deriving from a supernatural source external to empirical
reality, they are increasingly seen as properties of that reality itself” (20, emphasis
in original). Weber shows, then, that the Protestant religious—and by extension
the modern and postmodern religious—are heavily invested in the assumption that
transcendence can and should be controlled by technology.
Still, the primal and archaic religious remain deeply relevant. Keith Thomas’s
Religion and the Decline of Magic, for example, suggests how the same instincts
that drive modern and postmodern cultures to seek technological transcendence
have also driven humanity toward the magical. This is one point where Freud’s
claim that religion is about protecting oneself from the unknowns of nature rings
true: Thomas shows how conversion to Christianity has “frequently been assisted
by the belief of converts that they are acquiring not just a means of other-worldly
salvation, but a new and more powerful magic” (25). In turning from a profusion of
numinous gods (primal religious) to their concentration in specific objects (archaic
religious), and then to their further concentration in a single divinity (monotheistic
religious), humanity seeks greater control of the divine. Not surprisingly, Thomas
demonstrates that this causes moments of considerable confusion and blurring of
distinctions: in medieval Christianity, “If any misfortune befell them or their animals
their common saying was ‘You have not crossed yourself well today’, or ‘You have
not made the sign of the rood upon the cattle’” (31). In other words, because it
never wholly abandons the primal or archaic religious, the monotheistic religious
can be understood as a matter of a new technique, or technology. For Thomas this
is evident even in the Mass: “the clergy’s anxiety that none of the consecrated
elements should be wasted or accidentally dropped on the floor encouraged the
idea that the Host was an object of supernatural potency.” This led to the assump-
tion that if the Host were secreted away in one’s mouth, a person “could use it to
cure the blind or the feverish; he could carry it around with him as a general protec-
tion against ill fortune, or he could beat it up into a powder and sprinkle it over his
garden as a charm against caterpillars” (34). Despite the monotheistic trappings of
Catholicism’s triumph over pagan religions, then, Thomas indicates that the primal
and archaic religious remain crucial sedimentary layers. He demonstrates that “the
essential difference between the prayers of a churchman and the spells of a magi-
cian was that only the latter claimed to work automatically; a prayer had no cer-
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tainty of success and would not be granted if God chose not to concede it.” How-
ever, even if the prayer was “supplication” and the spell was “a mechanical means
of manipulation,” “this distinction was repeatedly blurred in the popular mind” (41).
When such obfuscation occurs, Thomas says, the resulting “advancement” to a
new form of the religious can be understood as technological.
With Weber and Thomas in mind, we can better appreciate modernity and
postmodernity’s reinvestment in attempts to control the transcendent—to measure
and prove it, to hold it down as object and use it. Here works by Graham Ward and
Jacques Derrida become central: Ward’s True Religion as explanation of the
commodified religion that emerges in modernity and expands in postmodernity, and
Derrida’s Acts of Religion as confirmation of Ward as well as a vision of the “impos-
sible” way forward. First, Ward claims that today “the only transcendence is expe-
rience of the spectacular itself” (29). He argues that “the end [of religion] does not
signal the falling into disuse or the oblivion of the religious. Rather, it signals
exactly the opposite: the extension and hype of the religious as the ultimate vision
of the excessive and the transgressive” (34). In our times, religion is bound by
technology to global capitalism (or what Derrida calls “globalatinization”), and our
only goal is “to be consumed—for the subject to be ultimately and finally negated
by becoming one with the Absolute” (76). This reflects precisely the strange con-
current desire to control and to be immersed within the transcendent; we buy and
buy in order to possess tools that we ask to possess us. This “makes the ineffable
not only effable but bearable” (114); instead of being unutterably other, the divine
becomes a commodity fetish.
Above all, we turn to the spectacular. Ward’s favorite example is the theme park,
where we expect that the roller coasters will seem tremendously dangerous while
remaining in reality entirely safe. We measure the experience “in terms of how close to
experiencing raw violence one can come … in safety. […] Transcendence is equated
with experiencing intensity or extremity” (121). However, we do not want to be truly
fooled. One is mocked for genuine expressions of fear, so the arm-raised screams that
come with a ninety-degree descent always hold onto a shred of irony, or at least so we
claim later. “The simulations are to be enjoyed as simulations, the surface as surface”
(123). We are not expected to “believe” in the special effect, the technological miracle,
but simply to appreciate its technological genius. Indeed, I would suggest that this is
why the “special features” of today’s DVDs no longer hesitate to reveal how shots
were accomplished: the secret itself is now a commodity, and the new effect alone
justifies the price of admission, even if the film’s other elements are banal.
Ward shows that rather than the secular eliminating the religious, the two cat-
egories constantly feed off and replenish each other. In postmodernity, “religion
does not live in and of itself any more—it lives in commercial business, gothic and
sci-fi fantasy, in health clubs, themed bars and architectural design, among happy-
hour drinkers, tattooists, ecologists and cyberpunks” (132-33). Those that con-
sume such religion are not even buying religion; “they are consuming the illusions
or simulations of religion” (133). This is entirely compatible with what Derrida says
about how the modern and postmodern religious are inseparable from technoscience:
“the imperturbable and interminable development of critical and technoscientific
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reason, far from opposing religion, bears, supports and supposes it. […] religion
and reason have the same source” (66). The real question is why we are so insistent
in our attempts to hold them apart. This is the goal of secularism: to deny religion’s
importance, and as Zizek suggests, to mask the presence of ideology where it is
most active, in secularism itself. “Why is this phenomenon, so hastily called the
‘return of the religions,’ so difficult to think? Why is it so surprising?” Derrida
asks. “Why does it particularly astonish those who believed naïvely that an alter-
native opposed Religion, on the one side, and on the other, Reason, Enlighten-
ment, Science, Criticism (Marxist Criticism, Nietzschean Genealogy, Freudian
Psychoanalysis and their heritage), as though the one could not but put an end to
the other?” (45, emphasis in original). Simply put, we have missed the way the
modern religious employs both the rationalist logic and the technologies of the
secularist ideology it claims to oppose, and conversely, how secularism stands or
falls upon its opposition to religion.
Derrida’s most thorough expansion on this claim is the sixty-page essay, “Faith and
Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” first pub-
lished ten years ago and now found at the head of his volume Acts of Religion. This
dense essay’s central claim is that we must distinguish, on one hand, between “reli-
gion” that is bound with “a band of opposition” to Enlightenment objectivity, and on
the other, a deeper, far less visible “faith.” Certainly, he acknowledges that there is a
modern religious that is nothing more than a mask for the rational, an “ontotheology
which determines absolute knowledge as the truth of religion” (53). For Derrida,
however, there is also a rarely explored abyss of faith yawning beneath the Enlighten-
ment religion and science dancing around the volcano’s rim. Between two apparently
opposite ideologies—in reality committed to the same claims of certain knowledge—
Derrida imagines an aporia. Figuring it successively as the island, the Promised Land,
and the desert, he identifies it as a place without certainty and without horizons of
expectation, “where one neither can nor should see coming what ought or could—
perhaps—be yet to come” (47). To make this central distinction, one must realize that
“faith has not always been and will not always be identifiable with religion, nor,
another point, with theology” (48). Where such identification can be made, Derridean
faith resembles apophatic theology, or the via negativa, rather than the knowledge-
enamored “proofs” of positivist theology. In any case, the key is to see that “the
temptation of knowing, the temptation of knowledge, is to believe not only that one
knows what one knows (which wouldn’t be too serious), but also that one knows what
knowledge is, that is, free, structurally, of belief or of faith—of the fiduciary or of
trustworthiness” (68). With Derrida, then, we understand that if fundamentalism and
secularism are opposing ideological attempts to repress either the religious or the
secular, then faith and knowledge are opposed epistemologies by which we may, on
one hand, take seriously both the religious and the secular, or on the other, acknowl-
edge neither.
In order to understand how “knowledge” in Derrida’s sense can be a product of
neglecting both the religious and the secular, and how “faith” is found in the place of
their convergence, consider another of his essays in Acts of Religion. “Force of Law:
The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” argues that “deconstruction takes place in
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the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility
of law” (243). Without rehearsing the whole of that argument, it is enough to say that
its distinction between the institutional law found in history and a more difficult to
isolate, “impossible” justice is akin to that between knowledge—whether found in
Enlightenment-based science or religion—and faith. In my terms, knowledge is a
deconstructible, law-like institution that attempts to repress all discussion of either the
religious or the secular, only implicitly recognizing that one invokes the other. On the
other hand, faith, like justice, is not deconstructible because it exists at the heart of a
dialectic, neither term of which it can deny. Rather than engaging technoscience in a
battle to the death, as both fundamentalism and secularism understand religion to do,
faith depends on giving place to both the religious and the secular.
One last essay in Derrida’s volume, “The Eyes of Language: The Abyss and the
Volcano,” is especially helpful here. Confirming Zizek’s idea that humanity’s invest-
ment in belief is greater today than ever before, Derrida argues that this is evident
simply because we use language. To do so is to take innumerable leaps of faith,
however unconsciously: we act constantly on the hope that our interpreters will
approximate the relationship between signifier and signified in a manner parallel to
or at least compatible with our own understanding. When we deny this, pretending
that language can be entirely objective, absolute, or empirical, we make insupport-
able claims of knowledge.
But we walk on the surface, we sleepwalk, only because we be-
lieve we are walking on the surface: we believe in the surface. In
truth—and this truth no longer belongs to the order of objectiv-
ity or of knowledge that is conveyed by the secular language of
the surface—there is no surface. There is only the abyss. Sacred
language is an abyss. We walk as blind men on its surface when
we speak about it. (202, emphasis in original)
Of course, this by no means indicates that faith is the simple, easy answer to our
problem. Rather, “it is difficult to know whether what is more terrible is to walk on
the surface as a blind man or to fall into the abyss as a man of lucid speech, awake,
vigilant, awakened to the abyssal essence of language” (202-203). Like using lan-
guage—though we often forget it—it is dangerous to recognize the depth of our
faith, much less cultivate it.
I believe that we are aware of this faith at some level, but that it is only rarely
identified as such in academic discussions of the religious and the secular. The
story is usually told in one of two ways: fundamentalism has seen the university as
recruiting ground, a place to demonstrate religion’s rationalism, and secularism has
put up an aggressive defense; alternatively, the university has defined “secular” to
signify the exclusion of belief, and fundamentalism has fought for its very identity.
The problem is that neither story offers hope of productive resolution, so humani-
ties departments that are in fact the best positioned to engage these issues tend at
best to shy away and at worst to engage in denial. Advice like that which I received
from my advisor a decade ago remains possible, if less likely. Indeed, early in my
doctoral work at the University of Iowa, I was again faced with considerable resis-
tance from an instructor during office hours. “You know,” this professor pondered,
“it never ceases to amaze me that someone can be in grad school and still take
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religion seriously.” Looking at me in honest bewilderment, he asked, “What the hell
makes you think religion even matters any more?” In my mind, this experience
suggests reason for both concern and hope: while I suspect that its profanity
points toward an act of repression, not just a conviction of irrelevance, what stands
out to me is that ten years ago I was offered a direct, absolute warning, but this
scholar asked a question.
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